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Inhuman and degrading punishment, dignity, and the limits of retribution 
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The recent judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in Vinter and others v United Kingdom provides a much needed clarification of the 
parameters of the prohibition on inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as it applies to whole life orders of 
imprisonment under mandatory life sentences – essentially, life imprisonment without parole. 
The Grand Chamber’s judgment refines Strasbourg doctrine on life imprisonment and the 
prospect of release and illuminates key principles concerning inhuman and degrading 
punishment under Article 3 of the ECHR. This article considers the judgment’s profound 




The recent judgment of the Grand Chamber in Vinter and others v United Kingdom1 has been 
met with criticism from senior members of the UK government and some media-fuelled 
public ire, portrayed by some as yet another example of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) dictating criminal justice principles in England and Wales contrary to the popular 
will.2 In this comment, I argue that it embodies a ground-breaking decision on the parameters 
                                                 
*Lecturer in Law, Queen’s University Belfast, United Kingdom (n.mavronicola@qub.ac.uk). The author would 
like to thank Jonathan Bild, Alan Greene, Nicola Padfield and the anonymous referee for their insightful and 
extremely valuable comments on an earlier draft. Special thanks are also due to Professor David Feldman for his 
invaluable guidance on my writings on Article 3 of the ECHR. The analysis is current to the best of my 
knowledge as of 17 July 2013. All errors are, of course, my own. 
1 Vinter and others v United Kingdom App Nos 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, Grand Chamber Judgment of 9 
July 2013, hereafter, Vinter [GC]. 
2
 For the government’s reaction, see N. Watt and A. Travis, ‘Tory ministers condemn ECHR ruling on whole-
life prison sentences’, The Guardian, 9 July 2013, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2013/jul/09/whole-life-sentences-david-cameron-human-rights (last visited 17 
July 2013); for the media take see, for instance,  G. Wilson, ‘Victory for Evil’, The Sun, 10 July 2013, available 
at http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/politics/5005765/Victory-for-evil-as-EU-judges-declare-that-
whole-life-sentences-are-inhumane.html (last visited 17 July 2013); N. Tebbit, ‘Time to leave the European 
Court for Criminal Privileges’, The Telegraph, 10 July 2013, available at  
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/normantebbit/100225858/time-to-leave-the-european-court-for-criminal-
privileges/ (last visited 16 July 2013); but cf M. Riddell, ‘Why the European Court is right on whole-life 
sentences’, The Telegraph, 9 July 2013, available at 
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/maryriddell/100225661/why-the-european-court-is-right-on-whole-life-
sentences/ (last visited 17 July 2013). The case has already been the subject of – generally positive – academic 
coverage on various blogs. See, for instance, N. Holcroft-Emmess, ‘Vinter v UK – Why The Majority Are Right 
To Find That Whole Life Orders Violate Article 3 ECHR’, Oxford Human Rights Hub Blog, 12 July 2013, 
available at http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=2247 (last visited 17 July 2013); D. Bunting, ‘Whole Life tariffs 
unlawful – Vinter v UK in the ECHR’, UK Criminal Law Blog, 11 July 2013, available at 
http://ukcrime.wordpress.com/2013/07/11/whole-life-tariffs-unlawful-vinter-v-uk-in-the-echr/ (last visited 17 
July 2013). 
of the absolute prohibition on inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), but one which is also faithful to previous 
ECtHR case law and the underlying values encompassed in the prohibition and the 
Convention itself. The judgment clarifies Strasbourg doctrine on life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole and casts light on key principles underpinning the notions of 
inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3. It carries important implications for 
penology and human rights although, as I indicate below, the full extent of its implications 
remains undefined. 
 
In the analysis below, I set out the facts and legal background to the case at issue and run 
through the Court’s judgment on the merits. I proceed to demonstrate that the Grand 
Chamber in Vinter not only imposes a procedural duty of review of whole life sentences but 
also establishes a principle of reducibility based on a rejection of ‘pure’ punishment – 
wording used by the UK government and the ECtHR, and carrying the meaning of 
‘retribution’ – as a legitimate penological ground for imprisoning an individual for life. The 
rejection of ‘pure’ punishment in this context and the emphasis on prisoner rehabilitation in 
the Court’s reasoning impact on penology as it relates to the absolute right enshrined in 
Article 3 of the ECHR and to the value of human dignity, which the Court portrays as 
underpinning not only Article 3 but the Convention more broadly.  
 
BACKGROUND 
The law in England and Wales imposes the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment on 
those convicted of murder.3 As the law currently stands, upon an individual’s conviction for 
murder, which automatically triggers the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, the trial 
judge is required to set a minimum term of imprisonment, which must be served by the 
individual convicted for the purposes of punishment and retribution before consideration for 
parole. Trial judges have been responsible for setting this minimum period of imprisonment 
since the Home Secretary’s role in setting the ‘tariff’ period was removed by the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 after a series of judicial decisions on the right to a fair trial.4 
 
The principles which guide the trial judge’s assessment of the appropriate minimum term are 
set out in Schedule 21 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003. A ‘whole life order’ may be imposed 
by the trial judge instead of a finite minimum term if the judge considers the seriousness of 
the offence to be exceptionally high, applying the principles in Schedule 21. If the whole life 
order has been imposed on conviction, the prisoner cannot be released other than at the 
discretion of the Secretary of State under section 30(1) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. 
The Secretary of State’s criteria for the exercise of that discretion are set out in Prison 
Service Order 4700, chapter 12, and comprise a cumulative set of requirements carving out 
very narrow circumstances which allow for compassionate release in cases of terminal illness 
or severe incapacitation. Under the statutory system which subsisted in England and Wales 
prior to the alterations brought about by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a review of the need 
for a whole life order took place after the prisoner had served 25 years of his or her sentence. 
This review mechanism was not included in the 2003 Act. 
 
                                                 
3
 See Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965, s 1. 
4
 See Stafford v United Kingdom App No 46295/99, Judgment of 28 May 2002; Benjamin v United Kingdom 
App No 28212/95, Judgment of 26 September 2002; and R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2002] UKHL 46. 
The three applicants were Douglas Gary Vinter, Jeremy Neville Bamber and Peter Howard 
Moore. They had all received mandatory life sentences upon conviction for murder, and had 
whole life orders imposed upon them. A whole life order had been imposed by the trial judge 
in the case of Vinter under the provisions in Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, 
whilst Bamber’s and Moore’s whole life orders had originally been imposed by the Secretary 
of State and were then confirmed by the High Court on their application for review under 
section 276 and Schedule 22 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which cover such transitional 
cases. 
 
Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides four different ‘starting points’ in the 
judicial assessment of the minimum term of imprisonment under a mandatory life sentence 
faced by a person whose crime was committed when he or she was over 18,5 which represent 
the baseline from which aggravating and mitigating factors can operate to adjust the order 
made by the judge. These ‘starting points’ are: a whole life order, a minimum term of 30 
years imprisonment, a minimum term of 25 years’ imprisonment, and a minimum term of 15 
years imprisonment. Whole life orders will be the starting point in cases where the 
seriousness of the offence is ‘exceptionally high’ (paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 21). These 
would include: cases involving the commission of murder by an offender previously 
convicted of murder (paragraph 4(2)(d)), as was the case in relation to Vinter; cases involving 
the murder of two or more persons with substantial premeditation or planning (paragraph 
4(2)(a)(i)), as was the case in relation to Bamber; and the murder of two or more people 
where each murder involved sexual or sadistic conduct (paragraph 4(2)(a)(iii)), as was the 
case in relation to Moore. The appeals lodged by the three applicants to the Court of Appeal 
were all dismissed, as the Court of Appeal found all whole life orders fully justified.6 
 
The applicants brought their cases to the ECtHR arguing that their prison sentences were in 
breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.7 The Chamber (Fourth Section) of the ECtHR, in a 
judgment on 17 January 2012,8 considered previous case law on the subject and found that an 
Article 3 issue would only arise if the applicants could show both that their sentences to life 
imprisonment were irreducible de facto and de jure and that their continued imprisonment 
could no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds, which, according to the Court, 
encompassed punishment,9 deterrence, public protection and rehabilitation.10 According to 
the Chamber, none of the applicants could show these two cumulative conditions. In 
particular, they could not show that their continued imprisonment was no longer justified on 
any penological grounds, with the Fourth Section of the ECtHR finding that their continued 
incarceration served the purposes of ‘punishment and deterrence’.11  
 
                                                 
5
 The starting points were formerly – and at the time relevant to the applicants – three, but a change occurred in 
2010 to insert para 5A into Schedule 21, under The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Mandatory Life Sentence: 
Determination of Minimum Term) Order 2010 (S.I. 2010/197). 
6
 See R v Vinter [2009] EWCA Crim 1399; R v Bamber [2009] EWCA Crim 962; R v Moore [2009] EWCA 
Crim 555. 
7
 A complaint under Article 5(4) of the ECHR was declared inadmissible by the Chamber in its consideration of 
the case and was held to fall outside the scope of the case before the Grand Chamber: Vinter [GC], n 1 above, 
para 132. 
8
 Vinter and others v United Kingdom App Nos 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, Judgment of 17 January 2012, 
hereafter, Vinter [Fourth Section]. 
9
 As stated above, presumably the Court uses the word ‘punishment’ to mean ‘retribution’.  
10
 Vinter [Fourth Section], n 8 above, para 92. 
11
 ibid para 95. 
In the Grand Chamber, the government argued – inter alia – that the Chamber’s judgment 
indicated that neither a life sentence without parole nor the serving of such a sentence was in 
principle incompatible with Article 3. It argued in clear terms that the penal policy on whole 
life terms of imprisonment without parole reflected the view of domestic authorities and 
Parliament ‘that there were some crimes so grave that they were deserving of lifelong 
incarceration for the purposes of pure punishment’.12 Indeed, the government emphasised that 
the ‘deserved’ sentence had been either imposed or affirmed by a court of law, which had 
taken into account all mitigating and aggravating factors.13 It therefore argued that a review 
mechanism would only offer ‘a tenuous hope of release’, given that ‘a whole life order was 
imposed to punish the offender for the exceptional gravity of his or her crime, and the gravity 
of that crime remained constant over time’.14 The government further submitted that a whole 
life order was not an irreducible life sentence as the Secretary of State’s power to order 
release was ‘wide and non-prescriptive’ and would have to be exercised compatibly with the 
Convention. Thus, according to the government, if the applicants ever sought to contend that 
their continued detention was not justified on any penological grounds, section 30 of the 
Crime (Sentences) Act would enable them to be released; any decision by the Secretary of 
State to the contrary would be amenable to judicial review.15 
 
In the Grand Chamber, the applicants argued that the Chamber had erred in finding that an 
Article 3 issue did not arise until such a time as there ceased to be legitimate penological 
grounds to justify continued incarceration, suggesting that the Chamber missed two issues: 
first, the substantive issue that whole life orders amounted to the proscribed ill-treatment ab 
initio; secondly, the need for a review to be built into a whole life sentence to avert a breach 
of Article 3.16 
 
With regard to the first issue, the applicants accepted that a life prisoner could spend the rest 
of his or her life in detention insofar as he or she remained a risk to the community, and that 
this would not amount to a breach of Article 3. However, in the applicants’ submission, as 
summarised by the Grand Chamber, ‘a whole life order which was imposed purely for the 
purposes of punishment directly undermined human dignity, destroyed the human spirit and 
ignored the capacity for countervailing justifications for conditional release which could arise 
in the future’.17 They further suggested that the justifications for imprisonment, which were 
punishment, deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation, formed a balance of factors 
which could change over time. According to the applicants, an unreviewable whole life order 
entailed incarceration until death irrespective of changes in these factors which might occur 
in the course of serving the sentence. The applicants further argued that a whole life order 
was fundamentally at odds with the principle of reintegration which dominated European 
penal policy, alluding to Council of Europe documents, CPT documents, and Contracting 
States’ law and practice.18   
 
As to the requirement of a review of a whole life order, the applicants submitted that the UK 
government had offered no principled reason for the failure to include a 25 year review in the 
                                                 
12
 Vinter [GC], n 1 above, para 92 (emphasis added). 
13
 ibid para 95. 
14
 ibid para 93 (emphasis added). 
15
 ibid para 94. 
16
 ibid para 98. 
17
 ibid para 99. 
18
 ibid. 
2003 Act, even though such review subsisted prior to the Act.19 Moreover, they suggested 
that their sentences were irreducible in fact, as no whole life prisoner had ever been released 
under section 30 of the 1997 Act or any other power.20 
 
JUDGMENT 
On the basis that the applicants were not arguing that their whole life orders were grossly 
disproportionate, the Grand Chamber sought to examine whether they breached Article 3 ‘on 
other grounds’.21 It proceeded to outline the general principles guiding this examination.  
 
It began by stating the rather circular principle that the criminal justice and penal system of a 
Contracting State ‘is in principle outside the scope of the supervision the Court carries out at 
the European level, provided that the system does not contravene the principles set forth in 
the Convention’.22 It alluded to a margin of appreciation allowed to Contracting States in 
deciding the appropriate length of imprisonment for different crimes, as this issue was the 
subject of ‘rational debate’.23 Thus, according to the Court, the imposition of a life sentence 
on adult offenders for particularly grave crimes is not in itself incompatible with Article 3 or 
any other Convention Article.24  
 
Nonetheless, as the Court swiftly noted, the imposition of an irreducible life sentence on an 
adult may raise an issue under Article 3, a principle – based on Kafkaris25 – which compelled 
the Court to emphasise and reaffirm two fundamentals:  
 
First, a life sentence does not become irreducible by the mere fact that in practice it 
may be served in full. No issue arises under Article 3 if a life sentence is de jure and 
de facto reducible… [T]he Court would emphasise that no Article 3 issue could arise 
if, for instance, a life prisoner had the right under domestic law to be considered for 
release but was refused on the ground that he or she continued to pose a danger to 
society…Indeed, preventing a criminal from re-offending is one of the “essential 
functions” of a prison sentence… 
Second, in determining whether a life sentence in a given case can be regarded as 
irreducible, the Court has sought to ascertain whether a life prisoner can be said to 
have any prospect of release. Where national law affords the possibility of review of 
a life sentence with a view to its commutation, remission, termination or the 
conditional release of the prisoner, this will be sufficient to satisfy Article 3.26 
 
The Court proceeded by outlining the legitimate penological grounds for detention, which in 
the Court’s view ‘will include punishment, deterrence, public protection and rehabilitation’.27 
                                                 
19
 ibid para 100. 
20
 ibid para 97. 
21
 ibid para 103. 
22
 ibid para 104. See also Kafkaris v Cyprus App No 21906/04, Grand Chamber Judgment of 12 February 2008, 
para 99. 
23
 Vinter [GC], n 1 above, para 105. See further T v United Kingdom App No 24724/94, Grand Chamber 
Judgment of 16 December 1999, para 117; V v United Kingdom App No 24888/94, Grand Chamber Judgment 
of 16 December 1999, para 118. 
24
 Vinter [GC], n 1 above, para 106. See also Kafkaris, n 22 above, para 97. 
25
 Kafkaris, n 22 above. 
26
 Vinter [GC], n 1 above, paras 108-109 (emphasis added). The Court cited Kafkaris, n 22 above, para 98. 
27
 Vinter [GC], n 1 above, para 111. 
Almost brushing aside the clear submission of the UK government that a whole life order 
may be imposed for the purposes of ‘pure punishment’,28 the Court then posited: 
 
[A]ny of these grounds will be present at the time when a life sentence is imposed. 
However, the balance between these justifications for detention is not necessarily 
static and may shift in the course of the sentence. What may be the primary 
justification for detention at the start of the sentence may not be so after a lengthy 
period into the service of the sentence. It is only by carrying out a review of the 
justification for continued detention at an appropriate point in the sentence that these 
factors or shifts can be properly evaluated.29 
 
The Grand Chamber proceeded to criticise the fact that the denial of a prospect of release and 
of a possibility of review faced by a prisoner under a whole life order entailed ‘a risk that he 
can never atone for his offence: whatever the prisoner does in prison, however exceptional 
his progress towards rehabilitation, his punishment remains fixed and unreviewable’.30 This 
is a clear rejection of purely retributive whole life sentences, based primarily on the 
penological principle of rehabilitation, which is eliminated by such sentences.  
 
The Court briefly made allusion to an argument that goes back to proportionality, a principle 
it originally appeared to dismiss as inapplicable to the case,31 by suggesting that, under a 
whole life sentence, ‘the punishment becomes greater with time: the longer the prisoner lives, 
the longer his sentence’ and paraphrasing Lord Justice Laws’ argument from Wellington that, 
even if a life sentence appears appropriate at the time of imposition, ‘with the passage of time 
it becomes…a poor guarantee of just and proportionate punishment’.32 The idea is that, 
depending on the life span of the individual, the punishment is ex ante of indeterminate 
length and may ultimately reach such length of time as to be disproportionate. The Court did 
not pursue this point much further however. 
 
Instead, the Grand Chamber referred with approval to the German Federal Constitutional 
Court’s (FCC) finding in the Life Imprisonment Case that it would be incompatible with 
human dignity for a person to be deprived of freedom without any chance to regain it 
someday, a principle that also led the FCC to establish, through the constitutional right to 
dignity, the principle of rehabilitation firmly into the German penological system.33 For the 
FCC, this meant truly enabling the prospect of rehabilitation and reintegration into society – 
the prospect of compassionate release only for the infirm or terminally ill was not sufficient.34 
The FCC’s take was of substantial persuasive value according to the Grand Chamber – as the 
Grand Chamber put it, ‘[s]imilar considerations must apply under the Convention system, the 
very essence of which, as the Court has often stated, is respect for human dignity’.35 It 
concluded its analysis by referring to European and international law, which, in the Court’s 
view, offered clear support for the idea that all prisoners, including those under life sentences, 
                                                 
28
 See n 12 above. 
29
 Vinter [GC], n 1 above, para 111. 
30
 ibid para 112. 
31
 See n 21 above. 
32
 R v Wellington [2007] EWHC 1109 (Admin), [39]. 
33
 BVerfGE 45, 187; Vinter [GC], n 1 above, para 113. 
34
 ibid. Lazarus elaborates on the ‘constitutional resocialisation principle’ in L. Lazarus, ‘Conceptions of 
Liberty Deprivation’ (2006) 69 MLR 738, 746-752. 
35
 Vinter [GC], n 1 above, para 113. 
should be offered the possibility of rehabilitation and the possibility of release if they are 
rehabilitated, noting that ‘while punishment remains one of the aims of imprisonment, the 
emphasis in European penal policy is now on the rehabilitative aim of imprisonment’.36  
 
This led the Grand Chamber to some general conclusions. It found that, in the context of life 
sentences, Article 3 must be interpreted as requiring reducibility via review by the domestic 
authorities, which must consider whether changes in the prisoner, particularly towards 
rehabilitation, have occurred so as to mean ‘that continued detention can no longer be 
justified on legitimate penological grounds’.37 After allusion to the margin of appreciation 
and the principle that the Court cannot prescribe the method and timing of review, the Court 
observed, with clear normative overtones, that ‘the comparative and international law 
materials before it show clear support for the institution of a dedicated mechanism 
guaranteeing a review no later than twenty-five years after the imposition of a life sentence, 
with further periodic reviews thereafter’.38 According to the Grand Chamber, ‘where 
domestic law does not provide for the possibility of such a review, a whole life sentence will 
not measure up to the standards of Article 3 of the Convention’.39 
 
The Court then addressed the issue of timing. It stated that, although review may take place 
quite a significant length of time subsequent to the imposition of a whole life sentence, whole 
life prisoners should not be obliged to wait for an indeterminate period before raising the 
complaint as to the lack of a review offering a prospect of release, as this would – inter alia – 
offend legal certainty. The Court pointed out that it makes little sense to expect a prisoner 
under a whole life order to work towards rehabilitation without knowing whether and when 
he would ultimately be entitled to be considered for release. Thus, according to the Court, a 
breach of Article 3 arises at the moment of imposition of the whole life sentence if it is 
imposed without a mechanism for review.40  
 
The Grand Chamber then applied its principles to the case at hand. It remained unconvinced 
by the UK government’s reasons for removing the 25 year review possibility, notably the 
argument that the Criminal Justice Act 2003 sought to judicialise decisions on minimum 
terms of imprisonment for those facing a mandatory life sentence. It considered that ‘the need 
for independent judges to determine whether a whole life order may be imposed is quite 
separate from the need for such whole life orders to be reviewed at a later stage so as to 
                                                 
36
 ibid paras 114-118. The Court here referred to a variety of documents on which it elaborated in earlier 
paragraphs (paras 60-64, 76), including Committee of Ministers Resolution 76(2) of 17 February 1976, Council 
of Europe; Committee of Ministers Recommendation 2003(23) (on the management by prison administrations 
of life sentence and other long-term prisoners) of 9 October 2003, Council of Europe; Committee of Ministers, 
Recommendation 2003(22) (on conditional release) of 24 September 2003, Council of Europe; J. Worsaae 
Rasmussen (European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment), Memorandum on Actual/Real Life Sentences, 27 June 2007, Council of Europe; Article 5(2) of the 
Framework Decision of the Council of the European Union of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant. It 
also referred to the practice on life imprisonment in Contracting States (paras 68-72) and beyond (paras 73-75).   
37
 ibid para 119. 
38
 ibid para 120. 
39
 ibid para 121. It is not clear whether the phrase ‘such a review’ means after a maximum of 25 years: this 
appears to be left open by the Court. 
40
 ibid para 122. In a video commentary on the judgment, Nicola Padfield highlighted this paragraph as lying at 
the centre of the Court’s analysis: see N. Padfield, ‘Law in Focus: Vinter v UK – the right to hope and the whole 
life tariff’, 17 July 2013, available at http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/press/news/2013/07/law-in-focus-vinter-v-uk--
the-right-to-hope-and-the-whole-life-tariff--nicola-padfield/2291 (last visited 17 July 2013). 
ensure that they remain justified on legitimate penological grounds’.41 It is clear from this 
statement that the Court essentially did not accept the government’s argument that the whole 
life term was the minimum term imposed for purely retributive purposes – it indicates rather 
that, in the Court’s view, the retributive aspect of the sentence at some point effectively ‘runs 
out’ – or must run out.  
 
Moreover, the Grand Chamber was not persuaded that the Secretary of State’s power under 
section 30 of the Crimes (Sentences) Act 1997 created a meaningful prospect of release. In 
essence, the Court was not convinced of the de jure and de facto reducibility of the whole life 
terms imposed on the applicants. It did not find that a sufficient degree of certainty existed as 
to the substantive or procedural contours of their prospects of release, particularly given the 
restrictive subsisting policy published by the Secretary of State.42 The Court clarified that 
‘compassionate release of this kind was not what was meant by a “prospect of release” in 
Kafkaris’.43 The Grand Chamber reflected on the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Bieber,44 in 
which the UK Court of Appeal acknowledged that the restrictive policy of the Secretary of 
State raised an Article 3 issue. The Court of Appeal had suggested that the issue could be 
addressed by the Secretary of State applying his power, in an Article 3-compatible manner, to 
release anyone whose imprisonment could no longer be justified on any legitimate 
penological ground (at the point when it could no longer be so justified).45 Yet the Grand 
Chamber was not convinced that the possibility, based on the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, 
that either the Secretary of State or domestic courts reviewing the Secretary of State’s 
decision would adopt an ECHR-compatible interpretation of section 30 of the 1997 Act 
reflected the prospect of release required under Article 3, given the restrictive terms of Prison 
Service Order 4700.46 
 
Given the lack of a real, clear, prospect of release and the absence of a ‘dedicated review 
mechanism’, the Court considered that, as things stood, the applicants’ life sentences could 
not be regarded as reducible for the purposes of Article 3 of the ECHR and thus there was a 
breach of Article 3.47 Yet it sought to clarify that this finding did not mean that there were no 
longer any legitimate penological grounds for the applicants’ detention, and that the finding 
of a violation could not be understood as giving them the prospect of imminent release.48 The 
Grand Chamber did not award any compensation for non-pecuniary damage, as it considered 
that the finding of violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-
pecuniary damage sustained. 
 
In separate opinions, Judges Ziemele, Power-Forde, and Mahoney zoomed in on points that 
they wished to address further. Judge Ziemele, who voted with the majority, criticised the 
Court’s wording that ‘the finding of violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction’ and 
argued that, if the Court considers that the compensation sought is unjustified and thus 
decides not to award it, the Court should state this clearly and explain it. Judge Power-Forde, 
who voted with the majority, explained that what swayed the substantive decision for her was 
                                                 
41
 ibid para 124. 
42
 ibid paras 125-126. 
43
 ibid para 127. 
44
 R v Bieber [2008] EWCA Crim 1601. 
45
 ibid [48]. See Vinter [GC], n 1 above, paras 47-49. 
46
 Vinter [GC], n 1 above, paras 128-129. 
47
 ibid para 130. 
48
 ibid para 131. 
the ‘right to hope’: she argued that, though the applicants may ultimately remain in prison for 
the duration of their lives, they ought to retain the right to hope that someday they may have 
atoned for their wrongs. In her view, leaving them no such hope would be degrading.  
 
Judge Mahoney sought to clarify two elements of the judgment: the aspect of timing, and the 
reducibility requirement under Article 3 of the ECHR. He pointed out that an important 
aspect of the judgment concerned the timing at which the applicants could claim a breach of 
Article 3: in essence, the Grand Chamber had found that they could do so before their 
imprisonment reached a point when it could no longer be justified on any penological 
grounds (a substantive breach of Article 3 according to Judge Mahoney), if they could show a 
lack of reducibility (a breach of a procedural requirement of Article 3 according to Judge 
Mahoney). Judge Mahoney explained that this preventive application of Article 3 was 
nothing new, noting the extradition case of Soering v United Kingdom as the first example of 
such an approach by the ECtHR.49 Judge Mahoney then sought to rationalise the reducibility 
requirement as a pre-existing aspect of the case law, notably Kafkaris. He suggested that it 
was the timing at which the applicants could claim a breach of Article 3, due to a lack of 
reducibility, which was the main development made by the Grand Chamber in Vinter.  
 
In the only dissenting opinion, Judge Villiger argued that the Grand Chamber was unduly 
departing from its ‘default’ individualised, concrete, ex post facto assessment in Article 3 
cases, whereby all relevant circumstances are considered before concluding on whether the 
Article 3 threshold of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment has been crossed. He 
suggested that such an approach did not ‘square easily with the principle of subsidiarity 
underlying the Convention’, not least on a matter which attracts significant disagreement. 
Judge Villiger argued that the Grand Chamber’s manner of analysing Article 3 – in an 
abstract, ex ante, non-individualised way – did not appropriately reflect Article 3’s ‘cardinal 
importance’ within the ECHR. Judge Villiger also pointed out that the Grand Chamber had 
not explained whether the irreducible whole life sentences amounted to inhuman or 
degrading punishment (or torture), and suggested that, if the applicants’ cases were 
considered at this point in time, none of them could be viewed as subjected to inhuman or 
degrading punishment.  
 
SIGNIFICANCE 
The judgment of the Grand Chamber in Vinter carries considerable significance for human 
rights and penology. It represents the culmination of the Court’s jurisprudence on the 
compatibility of whole life imprisonment of adults with the right not to be subjected to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.50 Article 3 of the ECHR is considered to 
proscribe such treatment and punishment ‘in absolute terms’, a point highlighted by the Court 
in a number of cases.51 Thus, the interpretation of the terms ‘inhuman’ and ‘degrading’ in 
relation to treatment or punishment inflicted upon individuals is of decisive importance: once 
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a treatment or punishment falls within such interpretation, it is absolutely prohibited and no 
external consequentialist reasoning provided by the government can justify it.52 
 
The most important case in which the Court dealt with the compatibility of whole life 
imprisonment with Article 3 before Vinter has been Kafkaris v Cyprus.53 In Kafkaris, the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR established the requirement of de jure and de facto 
reducibility.54 This did not mean that a life sentence must be reduced, but that it must be 
capable of being reduced: as a matter of law and as a matter of fact. Despite the system for 
Presidential pardon in Cyprus being problematic both as a matter of law and as a matter of 
fact – there were severe rule of law concerns regarding its application, which was not only 
uncertain but also rare – the Court found that Kafkaris’ life sentence was reducible de jure 
and de facto.55 It did not seek to set up any strict criteria concerning a review mechanism or 
to clarify the contours of a meaningful prospect of release, finding that there was significant 
disagreement on the subject amongst Contracting States.56  
 
In the segments from Vinter quoted above, the Grand Chamber made certain important 
remarks concerning the reducibility requirement, the need for a review mechanism, and the 
fluctuation of legitimate penological grounds in the course of a sentence of life 
imprisonment. There are four elements of considerable significance in the judgment.  
 
First, the Court clarified the proper interpretation of Kafkaris on reducibility, after it was 
arguably misinterpreted by the Fourth Section of the Court in Harkins and Edwards v United 
Kingdom,57 Babar Ahmad v United Kingdom,58 and the first instance Vinter judgment itself 
(all decided by the Fourth Section of the ECtHR).59 In particular, the misinterpretation given 
to Kafkaris was that a whole life sentence of imprisonment, whether it is a mandatory or 
discretionary one, would only raise an issue under Article 3 ‘when it can be shown: (i) that 
the applicant’s continued imprisonment can no longer be justified on any legitimate 
penological grounds (such as punishment, deterrence, public protection or rehabilitation); and 
(ii) as the Grand Chamber stated in Kafkaris…the sentence is irreducible de facto and de 
iure’.60  
 
In fact, the Grand Chamber in Kafkaris had stipulated that what is necessary to comply with 
Article 3 is ‘that a life sentence is de jure and de facto reducible’.61 The difference is 
significant, though couched in the subtleties of grammatical construction. Kafkaris 
established a requirement of reducibility: that a whole life sentence must be both de jure and 
de facto reducible to avoid breaching Article 3. The subsequent cases quoted above sought to 
                                                 
52
 N. Mavronicola, ‘What is an “absolute right”? Deciphering absoluteness in the context of Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 723. 
53
 See n 22 above and several references to Kafkaris by the Grand Chamber in Vinter [GC], n 1above. 
54
 Kafkaris, n 22 above, para 98. 
55
 ibid para 103. 
56
 Kafkaris, n 22 above, para 104. 
57
 Harkins and Edwards v United Kingdom App Nos 9146/07 and 32650/07, Judgment of 17 January 2012. 
58
 Babar Ahmad and others v United Kingdom App Nos 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09 and 
67354/09, Judgment of 10 April 2012. 
59
 Vinter [Fourth Section], n 8 above. 
60
 Harkins and Edwards v United Kingdom¸ n 58 above, para 137; Babar Ahmad and others v United Kingdom, 
n 58 above, para 242; Vinter [Fourth Section], n 8 above, para 92. This interpretation was based on UK court 
judgments, in particular R v Bieber, n 44 above, and R v Wellington, n 32 above. 
61
 Kafkaris v Cyprus, n 22 above, para 98. 
recast this into a requirement of irreducibility in order for a whole life sentence to raise an 
issue under Article 3: ie that a whole life sentence must be both de jure and de facto 
irreducible to offend Article 3. Thus, whilst either de facto or de jure irreducibility would 
clearly offend the reducibility requirement in Kafkaris, the subsequent cases constructed a 
higher threshold whereby it must be both in order to offend the reducibility requirement. The 
Court reaffirmed that the requirement is one of de jure as well as de facto reducibility. This is 
a point of great significance that is missing in Judge Mahoney’s analysis, which appeared to 
equate the Fourth Section’s analysis with the Grand Chamber’s analysis in Vinter.62 
 
Secondly, the Court’s choice of emphasis on dangerousness, in its statement that ‘no Article 
3 issue could arise if, for instance, a life prisoner had the right under domestic law to be 
considered for release but was refused on the ground that he or she continued to pose a 
danger to society’63 reflects a very sharp perspective on whole life terms of imprisonment. It 
is no accident at all that the Court refers to the dangerousness of the incarcerated individual 
(and to the State's need to protect the public from further potential criminal action of such 
individuals) as the key reason they may ultimately in fact be kept in prison for life. It is a 
clear indication that the Court, in contrast with the UK government,64 does not accept that the 
retributive (and deterrent) purpose of imprisonment can in itself justify whole life 
imprisonment.  
 
The Grand Chamber cemented this position by making numerous references to international 
treaties, Council of Europe documents, and European Court judgments which stipulate that 
prisoners should be given the possibility to atone for their crimes within their lifetime, the 
possibility to attain rehabilitation and enjoy a prospect of release if they achieve it (and thus 
no longer pose a threat to the public). The emphasis on rehabilitation – another legitimate 
penological ground, in the Court’s reasoning – does not simply adjust the balance of 
penological grounds during the course of imprisonment, as the Court puts it somewhat 
misleadingly.65 It refutes the possibility of Article 3-compatible purely retributive whole life 
terms of imprisonment. Instead, the Court’s choice of emphasis suggests that there must be a 
finite punitive term, with further imprisonment being premised on the need for public 
protection if the individual remains dangerous. This is highly significant. The minimum term 
(formerly known as tariff) in English criminal law embodies the retributive term of 
imprisonment.66 The minimum term of life imprisonment, found in the Criminal Justice Act 
2003, is no longer to be seen as Article 3-compatible. Indeed, the indicative term of 25 years 
provided by the Court may suggest that even the 30 year minimum terms should be 
reconsidered. Beyond England and Wales, this sends a message to many other Contracting 
States and, as I argue below, to non-ECHR States also. 
 
Thirdly, the Grand Chamber judgment clearly establishes the procedural requirement of 
review. This entails that not only must there be a prospect of release (though not, certainly, a 
guarantee of release), as established in Kafkaris, there must also be a procedure set up 
allowing prisoners to be considered for release at a certain point in time. The Court had been 
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hesitant to establish a clear review requirement in Kafkaris, noting a lack of agreement 
between States on the subject as well as the reforms the Cypriot government was putting in 
place.67 The affirmation of this procedural requirement by the Grand Chamber in Vinter 
cemented the idea that ‘for a life sentence to remain compatible with Article 3, there must be 
both a prospect of release and a possibility of review’.68 Nonetheless, the Grand Chamber left 
the particulars of the mechanism open to Contracting States. Notwithstanding this, if the 
review mechanism and prospect of release are lacking, the life sentence will be in breach of 
Article 3 as of its imposition - an important matter of timing, as outlined above. Indeed, with 
this implication in mind, the significance of the review requirement is not just procedural. It 
is indelibly tied to the need for prisoners to have a realistic prospect of eventual release – in 
other words, hope – from the beginning of their imprisonment, so as to accord them the 
minimum level of respect substantively required by the prohibition on inhuman and 
degrading treatment and punishment under Article 3.  
 
Extrapolating from this, it may well be that the indicative term of 25 years prior to review 
may have to be adjusted in relation to older prisoners facing pre-parole terms – either under 
life imprisonment or under other sentences – which are likely to last longer than their 
foreseeable lifetime. This point is not explicit in the Grand Chamber’s reasoning, but appears 
to be a plausible inference.69 A more flexible approach would thus have to be taken by the 
authorities towards ensuring that the retributive term is likely to be finite, so as to allow for a 
‘window’ of possibility for release within the prisoner’s lifetime, subject to public protection 
concerns.  
 
Fourthly, despite making passing reference to the margin of appreciation70 and refraining 
from strictly specifying the parameters of the review mechanism, the Grand Chamber in 
Vinter is otherwise taking seriously the specification of the absolute right enshrined in Article 
3.71 It puts human dignity on the table as a value underpinning Article 3 and the Convention 
more broadly – suggesting that ‘the very essence’ of the Convention system is ‘respect for 
human dignity’72 – and seeks to unpack dignity’s implications in the context of whole life 
sentences using comparative methodology and its own precedent. It is the emphasis on the 
dignity of all human beings that leads the Grand Chamber to establish the ultimate primacy of 
rehabilitation as a penological goal and to reject purely retributive imprisonment for life as 
incompatible with Article 3 – given its incompatibility with rehabilitation and thus with 
dignity.  
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The Court’s reasoning on dignity borrows, inter alia, from the FCC’s interpretation of the 
untouchable constitutional right to dignity (Article 1(1) of the Grundgesetz) in the Life 
Imprisonment case. This is to be welcomed: the Bundesverfassungsgericht certainly takes 
dignity seriously – it is the supreme principle of the German constitution.73 It can therefore be 
trusted to have invested painstaking consideration into its interpretation. Certainly, the Grand 
Chamber does not provide us with an exhaustive, clear-cut, definition of dignity, which is an 
admittedly complex and often elusive concept.74 Yet it provides us with a concrete 
application of it, and one which is both persuasive and doctrinally coherent, in light of 
Kafkaris. Moreover, contrary to the arguments of Judge Villiger, the ex ante, rather than ex 
post facto, nature of the Court’s analysis and findings is not only doctrinally apposite, as 
explained by Judge Mahoney, it is also in line with the cardinal importance of Article 3 as an 
absolute right under the Convention. Given the absolute nature of Article 3, it is 
commendable that the Grand Chamber is providing guidance through real rules on what is 
required under the right it enshrines, so that it may be respected rather than flouted.75 
 
Nonetheless, the Grand Chamber’s guidance could be further clarified. As Judge Villiger 
pointed out, the Court did not draw out precisely why or how irreducible life sentences reach 
the Article 3 threshold of inhuman and/or degrading punishment. The Grand Chamber could 
have consolidated its analysis on dignity, rehabilitation, and retribution, and spelt out with 
more clarity that purely retributive irreducible sentences of life imprisonment amount to 
inhuman and/or degrading punishment because they deny human dignity in denying the 
possibility of rehabilitation and thus release and reintegration into society. Although I hope 
that my analysis demonstrates that this is what the Court’s reasoning entails, it would 
certainly have been better if the Court itself had made it explicit. This last concern is not just 
an abstract point of conceptual coherence; more concretely, it is likely that domestic 
authorities – in the UK and beyond – will struggle to unpack the full implications of the 
judgment, for instance as regards those facing criminal sentencing when already at an 
advanced age. This ‘unpacking’ may well involve extensive litigation both domestically and 
in Strasbourg. 
 
Beyond the significance of the above elements of the Court’s reasoning, the judgment is 
likely to hold significant ramifications regarding extradition cases. In particular, many 
extradition requests from the United States often carry the prospect of discretionary or 
mandatory life sentences, as was the situation in cases such as Harkins76 and Babar Ahmad77 
(the outcomes of which may appear problematic after this Grand Chamber judgment). 
Subject to some problematic dicta of the Fourth Section of the ECtHR in Harkins and Babar 
Ahmad, to the effect that what may be inhuman in ECHR States may not be inhuman outside 
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ECHR States,78 the incompatibility of purely retributive whole life terms with Article 3 of the 
ECHR could operate to bar a number of extraditions to the US and elsewhere, under the 
Chahal and Saadi principles.79 
 
CONCLUSION 
In 2010, Dirk Van Zyl-Smit suggested that the ECtHR was moving towards the recognition 
of ‘the fundamental dignity of all people’ in giving those serving life sentences ‘a fair 
prospect of release while they may still be able to play a role in society’, and predicted that it 
would develop its analysis in Kafkaris towards ‘the unambiguous outlawing of irreducible 
life sentences in the near future’.80 The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR has done so in a 
judgment which affirms the prevailing significance of rehabilitation as a penological goal, 
and which rejects retribution as an adequate ground for locking an individual up for the 
duration of his or her lifetime. What the judgment does not do is allow the release of those 
facing life sentences after committing a serious crime while these individuals remain a danger 
to society. Thus Vinter embodies an appropriate affirmation and elaboration of the 
implications of Article 3 on whole life terms of imprisonment and is to be welcomed. At the 
same time, its full implications are likely to require further elucidation in the near future.  
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